I. INTRODUCTION
For the modern mind, and perhaps even more so for the mind of the modern businessperson, charity-or love-and truth seem foreign to corporate governance. In fact, talking about love and truth in most contexts makes people a bit uncomfortable. Yet, both love and truth are absolutely critical to answering fundamental questions, including those regarding corporate governance.
Should corporations be managed to maximize shareholder wealth? Should they be managed in a socially responsible manner, taking into account the interests of both shareholders and other stakeholders? Without a firm grounding in charity and truth, we will never find satisfactory answers to these questions.
Without truth, answers to questions of corporate governance merely lead to more questions. It is only in truth that we can find real answers, and it is only when we are grounded in truth that we can know how to lovethat is, how to seek what is good and "take effective steps to secure it." 1 According to Pope Benedict XVI, to know how to love, we must begin with truth; for without it, it is impossible to know what is good.
2 Absent truth, our answers to the fundamental questions regarding corporate governance ever will remain subject to personal preference and "cultural and historical limitations." 3 Modern debate about corporate governance dates back to the 1930s. 4 Since then, two primary schools of thought have emerged. One contends that corporations are to be managed to maximize shareholder wealth. 5 The other asserts that corporations are to be managed in a socially responsible manner, taking into account not only the interests of its shareholders, but also the interests of its various other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, and society at large. 6. See id. (indicating that one side of the debate contends that stakeholders ought to be considered in corporate decisionmaking). Loyola Law Review [Vol. 56 given to the 'how' questions, and not enough to the many 'why' questions underlying human activity." 13 A similar risk applies to law. If not enough time is spent considering "why" questions, we might erroneously conclude that the law is "self-sufficient." Mindful of Pope Benedict's admonition, this Article considers the "why" questions about corporate governance. It does not propose policy prescriptions, but instead explores what principles ought to guide how we structure corporate law.
Part II of this Article describes the fundamental principles of Catholic Social Thought and gives a brief history of Catholic Social Thought relevant to corporate governance as articulated in Rerum Novarum 14 and papal encyclicals since. Part III discusses the focus of Caritas in Veritate and its explanation of principles of Catholic Social Thought relevant to corporate governance. Part IV discusses how various scholars have applied Catholic Social Thought to the debate about corporate governance and evaluates the two existing interpretations of Catholic Social Thought in light of Caritas in Veritate. Finally, Part V concludes that Caritas in Veritate offers important lessons to those on both sides of the corporate governance debate by stressing that shareholder wealth maximization must be tempered by charity and that corporate social responsibility must be grounded in truth.
II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND PRE-CARITAS IN VERITATE SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS
To understand what Caritas in Veritate contributes to the corporate governance debate, one must understand the fundamental principles of Catholic Social Thought and how popes from Pope Leo XIII to Pope John Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI's immediate predecessor, have explained those principles in addressing matters related to corporate governance. Such a foundation is particularly important because there is no single source that definitively sets out the requirements of Catholic Social Thought. 15 Indeed, Catholic Social Thought represents "an evolving response to a concern 13 . CARITAS IN 
A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church identifies the dignity of the human person, the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity as the four fundamental principles of Catholic Social Thought. 17 Although the explanation of these principles has evolved over time as new circumstances have arisen, the principles themselves are constant. 18 They represent a unified framework to be applied collectively, and it is inappropriate to apply one or more principles to the exclusion of others. 17. COMPENDIUM, supra note 14, ¶ 160. Not everyone agrees on the nomenclature for the fundamental principles or that there are only four. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops lists seven "key themes" of Catholic Social Teaching: (1) life and dignity of the human person, (2) call to family, community, and participation, (3) rights and responsibilities, (4) option for the poor and vulnerable, (5) the dignity of work and the rights of workers, (6) solidarity, and (7) care for God's creation. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Themes of Catholic Social Teaching, http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/projects/socialteaching/excerpt.shtml (last visited Jan. 1, 2011). In Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought, Mark Sargent lists seven "core principles": "human dignity, the common good, the reciprocity of rights and obligations, the contingency of property rights, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the preferential option for the poor." Sargent, supra note 11, at 562 (emphasis added).
18. See QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 16, ¶ 2 (asserting that the fundamental principles do not change); LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 16, ¶ 11 (noting that the social doctrine has remained unchanged over the years); SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 16, ¶ 3 (indicating that the social doctrine is "constant").
19. See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE ¶ 4 (2002), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_ doc_20021124_politica_en.html ("The Christian faith is an integral unity, and thus it is incoherent to isolate some particular element to the detriment of the whole of Catholic doctrine"); see also Loyola Law Review [Vol. 56 This is not to say, however, that each principle is given equal weight. Dignity of the human person is the foundational principle from which the other principles derive.
20
According to Catholic Social Thought, the dignity of the human person is grounded in the natural law 21 and in the human person's creation in the image and likeness of God. 22 Civil structures-political, economic, social, and others-exist for the benefit of the human person and must be arranged to serve the human person. 23 The human person must never be considered an object to be utilized for the purposes of another or of society.
24
Human dignity requires both personal freedom 25 24. See QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 16, ¶ 83 (noting that labor must not be considered "mere chattel" because human dignity is inherent in labor); LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 16, ¶ 7 (asserting that it is an error to treat humans as instruments); CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 16, ¶ 13 (observing that socialism's error is to consider "the individual person simply as an element, a molecule within the social organism").
25. There are some men who seem to think their acts are freer in proportion as they are without purpose, as if a rational purpose imposed some kind of limitation upon us. That is like
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Personal freedom in Catholic Social Thought is not rugged individualism.
29
The human person is by nature a social being and is called to life in a community. 30 In fact, community is necessary to protect each person's dignity.
31
The common good "is the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily."
32 It is not merely the "sum" of the individual good of members of the community. 33 Rather, it truly is common, requiring collective action 34 and consisting of the good-that is, the moral goodboth of society as a whole and of each person. 35 The common good is not an end, but has value only to the extent that it allows each individual and society as a whole to attain the ultimate Good, which is God.
36
The principle of subsidiarity requires that organizations of a higher order make decisions and take actions only to the extent that organizations of a lower order or individuals are not competent or able to do so. 37 In the United States, for example, to be consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, the Federal government should not do what State governments are competent to do. Similarly, State governments should not undertake matters that private associations, families, or individuals may address competently.
Government's role is to support and assist lower organizations and individuals and to perform functions that lower saying that one is richer if he throws money out the window than if he spends it.
Id. at 28.
29. See OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 16, ¶ 23 (noting that equal rights must be tempered by solidarity so that they are not inconsistent with the common good).
30. By and large, the modern social encyclicals prior to Caritas in Veritate have not addressed corporate governance directly. 52 They have had much to say, however, about topics that are relevant to corporate governance: private property, freedom of contract, the role of profit, and the business organization as a community. Government, he asserted, has a strict obligation to preserve the right to private property because "neither justice nor the common good" sanctions the taking of another's property. 56 Pope Leo explained, however, that charity-a moral duty not enforceable by law-imposes limits on the right to private property. 57 Pope Leo's successors affirmed that private property is a natural right, 58 but began to emphasize more and more that its use may be limited to the extent required for the common good.
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno indicated that property owners must use their property not only for themselves, but also for the common good, and he acknowledged that government properly could define the limits of its use in light of the common good.
59
In Mater et Magistra, Pope John XXIII asserted that the right to private property is necessary for human freedom, but admitted the legitimacy of public ownership when private ownership posed a danger to the common good and when public ownership did not conflict with the principle of subsidiarity. 60 Pope Paul VI in Populorum Progressio warned that the "exclusive pursuit of possessions" is dangerous to the protection of the dignity of the human person 61 and noted that, therefore, the right to private property must give way to a just distribution of goods. 62 In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II cautioned that private property "is under a 'social mortgage,' which means that it has an intrinsically social function, based upon and justified" by the fact that the goods of the world were meant for use by all. 63 55. RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 14, ¶ 66 (indicating that giving people the opportunity to work for their own property contributes to a nation's wealth 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
The modern social encyclicals, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, undeniably favor freedom of contract in establishing private relationships. In Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII asserted that, in general, employers and employees are to be free to structure their economic relationships. 64 Pope Pius XI, in Quadragesimo Anno, affirmed freedom of contract in the employment context by indicating that, although it is preferable for employees to be given an ownership stake in a business, a contract that merely provides for the payment of wages is just. 65 Pope John XXIII in Mater et Magistra more broadly declared that private citizens should be free to order their economic relationships 66 and emphasized that the common good requires that private individuals be free to form their own organizations and to set the rules for those organizations. 67 Observing that the free market is superior to government in efficiently allocating resources and responding to needs, 68 Pope John Paul II's Centesimus Annus advocates freedom in structuring economic relations, so long as such freedom is used responsibly.
69
Just as the right to private property is not unbounded, neither is freedom of contract. Pope Leo XIII indicated in Rerum Novarum that, in the employment context, freedom of contract applies only to the extent there is parity in bargaining power 70 and to the extent that employees receive a just wage. 71 According to Pope Paul VI in Populorum Progressio, when bargaining power is unequal, mutual consent does not ensure fairness, and the principle of freedom of contract remains subject to the requirements of justice. 72 In capital is entitled to a "fair share" of profits, and labor is entitled to an "ample sufficiency." 77 Pope Pius admitted that pursuing wealth is not bad-indeed it is consistent with God's plan-but the pursuit must be tempered by concern for the common good. 78 According to Pope Pius, an excessive desire for wealth is inconsistent with the requirements of Christian moderation. 79 Pope John XXIII in Mater et Magistra similarly noted that the generation of wealth always must be subordinate to the preservation of the dignity of the human person. Pope John indicated that, even if wealth is distributed equitably, its acquisition is unjust if the manner in which it is acquired violates human dignity.
80
According to Pope Paul VI in Populorum Progressio, focusing on profit as the primary motivation for economic activity encourages the pursuit of money in a manner that is inconsistent with the principle that the economy should serve humans, not the other way around. 81 In Octogesima Adveniens, Pope Paul asserted that a healthy economy is measured not just by increasing wealth, but also by "[t]he quality and the truth of human relations, the degree of participation and of responsibility." 83 Pope John Paul II in Laborem Exercens asserted that profit maximization cannot be the fundamental standard for an economic system. 84 Instead, respect for the worker-for human dignity-must be the guiding principle of the economy. 85 In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul was even more direct, indicating that an overwhelming desire for profit is contrary to God's will. 86 Building up goods and services "even for the benefit of the majority" does not lead to human development.
87 To achieve peace, the pursuit of individual profit must give way to a quest for the common good. 88 According to Pope John Paul, an excessive desire for profit is inconsistent with and must be overcome by solidarity, "a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual."
89
Pope John Paul II's harsh critique of the profit motive in Laborem Exercens and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis is counterbalanced by his discussion of the topic in Centesimus Annus, in which he explained it as an important, but nonexclusive criterion, for determining the health of a business.
The church acknowledges the legitimate role of profit as an indication that a business is functioning well. When a firm makes a profit, this means that productive factors have been properly employed and corresponding human needs have been duly satisfied. But profitability is not the only indicator of a firm's condition. It is possible for the financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people-who make up the firm's most valuable asset-to be humiliated and their dignity consider the profit motive as the primary mode of economic progress and that an economic system is "meaningless" if it does not serve humanity).
82. See POPULORUM PROGESSIO, supra note 35, ¶ 34 ("It is not sufficient to increase overall wealth for it to be distributed equally.").
83. OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 16, ¶ 41. 84. LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 16, ¶ 17. 85. Id. 86. See SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 16, ¶ ¶ 37, 47 (stating that the "all-consuming desire for profit" is an attitude "opposed to the will of God" and that "one may sin through selfishness and the desire for excessive profit and power"). offended. Besides being morally inadmissible, this will eventually have negative repercussions on the firm's economic efficiency. . . . Profit is a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only one; other human and moral factors must also be considered which, in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of the business.
90
Based on Pope John Paul's explanation of Catholic Social Thought, then, seeking profit is legitimate, but businesses must be oriented to the common good. 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AS A COMMUNITY
Although not all of the modern social encyclicals have emphasized the communitarian nature of the business enterprise, 92 a number of them indicate that businesses are not only participants in the broader community, but communities themselves.
Pope Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum encouraged recognition of mutual interdependence of capital and labor and promoted their working together for the common good.
93
In Mater et Magistra, Pope John XXIII suggested,
[M]utual relations between employers and directors on the one hand and the employees of the enterprise on the other be marked by mutual respect, esteem, and good will. . . . [T]hey [must] perform their work not merely with the objective of deriving an income, but also of carrying out the role assigned them and of performing a service that results in benefit to others.
94
According to Pope John, business entities are "true human [communities] ," and as communities, they must be "concerned about the needs, the activities and the standing of each of its members." 95 Just as Pope Leo XIII recognized that both labor and capital need each other, Pope John Paul II described them as "inseparably linked. human work began to be valued only for its economic purpose. 97 Pope John Paul declared that work is much more; it unites people and has the power to build a community. 98 In Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul was explicit about the communitarian nature of the business enterprise:
In fact, the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a profit, but is to be found in its very existence as a community of persons who in various ways are endeavoring to satisfy their basic needs, and who form a particular group at the service of the whole of society.
99

III. CARITAS IN VERITATE
A. FOCUS
In Populorum Progressio, Pope Paul VI spoke about integral human development-development that "promote[s] the good of every [person] and of the whole [person] ." 100 In Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI takes a fresh look at integral human development and applies Pope Paul's teachings to the present.
101
As one would expect given its title, the encyclical focuses on charity and truth, which Pope Benedict asserts drive integral human development.
102 "In the present social and cultural context, where there is a widespread tendency to relativize the truth, practising charity in truth helps people to understand that adhering to the values of Christianity is not merely useful but essential for building a good society and for true integral human development."
103
According to Pope Benedict, the concepts of charity-or love-and truth are inseparable. 104 One must know truth in order to know how to love. Without truth, love is subject to distortion and can devolve into mere subjective sentimentality.
105
Without truth, love may be enslaved to emotion and blind faith. 106 Pope Benedict observes that truth is founded on and discovered 97. See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 16, ¶ 13 (noting that it is wrong to consider labor only from an economic perspective).
98. 108 Therefore, just as truth is necessary for love, so is love necessary for truth.
Catholic social doctrine, according to Pope Benedict, revolves around charity in truth, 109 and the principle of charity in truth is expressed in the standards that guide moral action.
110
Charity both requires justice and transcends justice.
111
Justice requires that I give to another what is rightfully his or hers; charity involves giving to another what is rightly mine.
112 Love always goes beyond justice, incorporating "gratuitousness, mercy and communion." 113 Pope Benedict asserts that striving for the common good is required by charity and justice. 114 According to the pope, in our interconnected world, the common good encompasses the good of all of humanity.
115 "The more we strive to secure a common good corresponding to the real needs of our neighbours, the more effectively we love them."
116 To strive for the common good requires concern for and use of the institutions that make up society, including the corporation.
117
B. RELEVANCE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Perhaps more than the other modern social encyclicals, Caritas in Veritate speaks directly to matters related to corporate governance. The encyclical includes a discussion of freedom of contract, extensively addresses the role of profit and devotes considerable attention to stakeholder interests and social responsibility. Through consideration of these topics, the encyclical provides a clear Catholic vision for corporate governance, one that employs the principles underlying the communitarian interpretation, but without requiring one to concur with the premise that a corporation is a community. 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Pope Benedict, consistent with prior modern social encyclicals, recognizes that parties should be free to structure their own economic relationships, but within limits. He acknowledges the necessity of contracts for commutative justice, 118 but asserts that commutative justice is not enough and that the Church consistently has emphasized the importance of distributive justice. 119 Commutative justice, he states, is not sufficient to "produce the social cohesion" that the market requires; solidarity must be fostered to achieve that end. 120 Pope Benedict stresses that, although government is primarily responsible for seeing that distributive justice and social justice are achieved, a spirit of gratuitousness also must pervade the free exchange in the market. 
ROLE OF PROFIT
Caritas in Veritate reaffirms profit's place within the economy. Pope Benedict explains that, to be faithful to charity in truth, maximizing profit must not be the sole basis on which business decisions are made.
122
According to the pope, Profit is useful if it serves as a means towards an end that provides a sense both of how to produce it and how to make good use of it. Once profit becomes the exclusive goal, if it is produced by improper means and without the common good as its ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth and creating poverty.
123
Pope Benedict, therefore, clearly explains the boundaries for maximizing profit. Maximizing profit is legitimate so long as the means by which profit is achieved are not unjust and the end sought is not other than the common good. Profit maximization, therefore, is inappropriate if achieved by, for example, paying employees an unjust wage, charging prices that border on extortion, or indiscriminately using natural resources. On the other end of the spectrum, profit maximization is inappropriate if it is for the purpose of maximizing personal consumption without regard to the needs of others. Within the bounds of just means and the common good, however, managers seeking to maximize profits have a lot of room to work.
Pope Benedict seems to suggest that there may have been a time when corporate managers could seek to maximize shareholder wealth without specifically focusing on the common good. 124 Historically, government has been charged with the task of preserving the common good and thus could be relied upon to regulate economic activity so that it would be oriented to that end. 125 Pope Benedict asserts that, when government can regulate effectively, the economic system can rely on government to reign in the economic system's excesses. 126 Globalization has hampered substantially the ability of government to preserve the common good, however, and now the economic system itself must be directed to that end. 127 Measurement of profit, of course, is subject to varying definitions, and Caritas in Veritate warns against the dangers of a short-term economic focus. Pope Benedict laments the rarity of managers who focus on the long-term well-being of a business rather than short-term returns.
128 Not surprisingly, he asserts short-term profits must not be sought at the expense of the long-term viability of a business. 129 Speculative practices, he stresses, damage the economy and threaten "the present and future good of humanity." 130 In Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict emphasizes the necessity of fostering new enterprises that are geared to principles other than pure profit. 131 This emphasis makes one wonder whether he has given up on 124. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 37 (noting that it may have been possible at one time to allow wealth creation to be left to the economy and to leave wealth distribution to the political sphere, but it is no longer so).
125. See QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 16, ¶ 110 (indicating that free competition must be subject to governmental control to ensure the common good).
126. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 24 (observing that, when economic activity was limited by national boundaries, governments could "determine the priorities of the economy and to some degree govern its performance").
127. See id. ¶ 37 (suggesting that globalization has required justice to be respected as profit is being created because local governments are not able to regulate sufficiently global economics). Almost 40 years earlier, Pope Paul VI recognized the same problem. See OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 16, ¶ 44 (noting that multinational businesses are "largely independent of the national political powers and therefore not subject to control from the point of view of the common good").
128 132 According to Caritas in Veritate, traditional, profit-seeking businesses have a place within the economy, but they must be understood in a fundamentally new way, with principles employed in the nonprofit world finding their way into the world of profitseeking businesses. 133 Pope Benedict notes favorably the trend toward economic structures that look beyond profit to loftier goals.
In recent decades a broad intermediate area has emerged between [profit-based companies and non-profit organizations]. It is made up of traditional companies which nonetheless subscribe to social aid agreements in support of underdeveloped countries, charitable foundations associated with individual companies, groups of companies oriented towards social welfare, and the diversified world of the so-called "civil economy" and the "economy of communion."
134
Caritas in Veritate specifically rejects the idea that these types of businesses represent a "third sector," a separate class of entity from profitbased and nonprofit organizations. 135 Instead, Pope Benedict asserts that the shift in focus represents a new reality that recognizes profit as a means toward the greater end of a civilized economy and society. 
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Caritas in Veritate unambiguously supports the principle that managers must be concerned with all of a corporation's stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, customers, society, and the environment. 137 Additionally, Pope Benedict considers it risky for a business to be accountable solely to its owners. 138 needed . . . is a market that permits the free operation, in conditions of equal opportunity, of enterprises in pursuit of different institutional ends.").
132. Caritas in Veritate acknowledges the "importance and the economic and social benefits of the more traditional forms of business," CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 46, and indicates that it is important to have "enterprises in pursuit of different institutional ends." Id. ¶ 38. In fact, "[t]he very plurality of institutional forms of business gives rise to a market which is not only more civilized but also more competitive." Id. at ¶ 46 (emphasis omitted Pope Benedict declares that friendship and solidarity within economic activity are necessary to make the market operate properly, but even more so because the market, in its essence, involves encounters between human beings.
139
Caritas in Veritate distinctly contends that every level of economic activity must incorporate gratuitousness to encourage solidarity and responsibility for the common good among all of the different participants in the economy.
140 "Solidarity is first and foremost a sense of responsibility on the part of everyone with regard to everyone, and it cannot be merely relegated to the State." 141 Therefore, for Pope Benedict, managers must be responsible for all of the stakeholders of a business, and it is not sufficient to leave to government the task of protecting the interests of stakeholders other than owners.
Consistent with other modern social encyclicals, Caritas in Veritate states that "the primary capital to be safeguarded and valued is . . . the human person in his or her integrity . . . ."
142 Pope Benedict specifically applies this principle in the context of business ethics. He notes favorably the recent focus on ethics in business and lauds the positive contributions of a new emphasis on ethical investment and financing. 143 He warns, however, that the term "ethics" can be distorted. 144 If not firmly grounded in moral norms that focus on the dignity of the human person and respect for the natural law, "ethics" may justify actions that are in fact unethical.
145
When detached from the dignity of the human person and the natural law, "ethics" is a mere label that is subject to the danger of "becoming subservient to existing economic and financial systems rather than correcting their dysfunctional aspects."
146 Caritas in Veritate declares that a true system of ethics-whether labeled as such or not-is needed, one that is focused on the dignity of the human person and the natural law.
147 This system of ethics, Pope Benedict emphasizes, must pervade the entire economic system, not just certain parts.
148
Corporations and their managers, therefore, certainly are not exempt. 
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IV. CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE
In the secular debate regarding the responsibilities of corporate managers, two primary theories have been competing with each other for years. 149 The first theory maintains that corporations are to be managed to maximize shareholder wealth.
150
Under this theory, the corporation operates efficiently and to the benefit of society if its managers focus on shareholder wealth, without taking into account other corporate stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers and the community in which the corporation operates.
151
Shareholder wealth-maximization proponents claim that other stakeholders can protect themselves by contract or through legislation.
152
They also claim that other stakeholders are protected because shareholders are entitled to a corporation's assets only after other interests have been satisfied.
153
The second theory in the secular debate contends that, in making decisions, a corporation's managers must be socially responsible and take into account not only the interests of its shareholders, but also the interests of the corporation's various other stakeholders.
154
The premise of this theory is that corporate benefits come with responsibilities. 155 The benefits of limited liability and perpetual existence that corporations enjoy are coupled with an obligation to the public that is broader than shareholder wealth maximization. Novak argues that, for political liberty to exist in a society, the political system, the economic system, and the moral-cultural system each must be relatively free. 166 Each system must be accountable to and appropriately may attempt to persuade and influence the others, but no system may be subordinate to any other. 167 For Novak, it is important for the economic system to be robust to protect against tyranny of the political system. 168 The political system, he asserts, poses a much greater threat to liberty than the economic system. 169 If the political system is held in check, the moral-cultural system (which includes, for example, churches) retains the ability to influence the economic system. 170 It is this influence that can cause the economic order to conform to God's plan. 171 Novak claims that, if the economic system becomes subordinate to the political system, the moral-cultural system will lose its influence.
172
According to Novak, corporations provide a strong economic base on which liberty relies. 173 More than that, Novak considers the corporation to be a moral institution, an instrument of God's grace, 174 "a crucial locus for the playing out of God-given human liberty." 175 The corporation, Novak claims, has been extremely successful in mining the riches of the world to serve humanity.
176
He asserts that the economic effects brought about through the corporation have been substantial and beneficial to society.
The productivity of the new economics has freed much human time for questions other than those of mere subsistence and survival. The workday has shrunk, and 'weekends' have been invented. After work, 166 . NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY, supra note 158, at 31. 167. Id. at 32. 168. Id. at 34. Consistent with this idea, Pope Paul VI in Populorum Progressio stresses the importance of having private individuals and intermediaries involved in pursuing ends set out by government for the common good; otherwise, the dignity of the human person may be threatened by collectivization. POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, supra note 35, ¶ 33.
169. NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY, supra note 158, at 34. Novak notes that "Max Weber argued that democratic capitalism is distinct from other commercial systems in the world because of the religious and moral value it attaches to commerce." Id. at 35.
170. See id. at 33 (suggesting that, in a balanced regime, executives can make decisions that are consistent with moral-cultural norms).
171. See id. at 35 (noting that commerce can be regarded "as the fulfillment of a vocation from God and a way of cooperating in the completion of Creation as God intended it").
172. See id. at 34 (asserting that abuses of the political system pose threats to the health of the moral-cultural system).
173. Id. at 33. 174. See Sargent, supra note 11, at 576 (indicating that Novak believes the corporation to be "intrinsically good").
175. Sargent, supra note 11, at 577. 176. See id. (suggesting that Novak views the corporation as extremely successful at realizing the treasures of God's creation for the "benefit of humanity"). Loyola Law Review [Vol. 56 millions now take part in voluntary activities that fill, in effect, another forty hour week (associations, sports, travel, politics, religion, and the like). Personal and social mobility have increased. Schooling has become not only common but mandatory. Teenagerhood has been invented. The 'stages of human life' have drawn attention with the emergence of the private self.
177
For Novak, the ability of corporations to foster international development is an example of how they serve as instruments for good. He observes that multinational corporations contribute capital facilities and technology to less developed countries, reduce those countries' reliance on imports and, through paying wages to local citizens, allow local capital in those countries to increase. 178 Novak asserts that American businesses are emissaries not only in an economic sense, but also in a political and moralcultural sense.
179 They are not primarily responsible for fostering human rights, but they certainly influence host countries by employing values of democratic capitalism in their operations.
180
By bringing the values of democratic capitalism to less developed countries, multinational corporations give those countries the opportunity to escape poverty. 181 Novak defends profit as an appropriate corporate purpose, indicating that it is critical to attracting new investment. 182 He distinguishes the goal of profit maximization from profit optimization, favoring the latter. 183 Novak explains that profit maximization consists of efforts to "obtain the greatest profit possible out of every opportunity[; it] is to be greedy in the present at the expense of the future."
184 Profit maximization, he observes, ultimately is destructive because it takes advantage of others to the detriment of the business. 185 Profit optimization, on the other hand, consists of efforts that "take many other factors besides profit into account, including long-term investment, consumer loyalty, and the sense of a fair service for a fair price." 186 Novak views the communal nature of the corporation as a sign of its grace. 188 He acknowledges that corporations depend upon communal organization and collaboration. 189 He asserts that "[f]or many, the workplace is a kind of second family."
190 Nevertheless, unlike a family, the corporation is only a "part-time" community; it is not a "total" community. 191 It exists only to serve a particular purpose.
192
To Novak, a corporation is a structure for delivering goods or services. 193 It is a nexus of contracts, 194 or a construct created with the expectation that its investors will profit and designed to avoid the inefficiency of negotiating a series of contracts with the various parties necessary to deliver goods or services. 195 Novak argues that efforts to impose social responsibility on the corporation-including "the philosophy of 'stakeholders'"-merely are attempts to socialize the corporation, to make it something it is not. 
sees the corporation as a nexus of contracts"). Stabile states,
The [nexus of contracts model] does not speak in terms of common good. Rather, it expresses the notion that each of the participants in the organization is a rational, selfinterested actor who seeks her own utility and contracts in a manner that optimizes selfinterest. The corporation is simply an aggregate of independent contractors, each pursuing her own interests. Under this model, each participant in the corporate enterprise owes to the other only those obligations contractually agreed to; everything to do with the relation between the corporation and the people with whom it deals, including employees, suppliers, customers, etc., is contractual in nature. in corporate governance should be limited and that leaving corporations with the economic freedom to pursue wealth is critical to human freedom. 198 According to Bainbridge, the corporation acts as a mediating institution, protecting communities from governmental intervention that would violate the subsidiarity principle and would curtail person liberty.
Id. at 188 (citations omitted
199
Although agreeing with Novak regarding the mediating qualities of the corporation, Bainbridge is skeptical of Novak's view of the corporation as a community in which virtue is cultivated. 200 According to Bainbridge, private institutions such as churches, schools, and fraternal organizations are communities in which virtue is fostered.
201 "Communitarian models of the corporation," Bainbridge asserts, "strain credulity past the breaking point."
202
Instead of viewing the corporation as a large community, Bainbridge agrees with Novak that "corporations harbor within them subgroups that evolve into communities of shared values." 203 It is these communities that require protection from the state. 204 Bainbridge argues that the shareholder wealth maximization norm is consistent with Catholic Social Thought and that a stakeholder approach is tradition).
198. See Bainbridge, supra note 158, at 599, 601 (asserting that "the state must provide a coercive backstop," but must "leave[] the catcher lots of room within to work" and that "preserving the economic freedom of corporations to pursue wealth is an essential part of effective means for achieving human freedom"); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 24 (claiming that, where there is economic liberty, there also is personal liberty); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON 199. See Bainbridge, supra note 158, at 598 (contending that the Church's subsidiarity principle recognizes that the state and the community are not compatible and that "subordination of economic institutions to the state poses a grave threat to both communal and personal liberty"). Bainbridge insists:
Those whose livelihood depends on corporate enterprise cannot be neutral about political systems. Only democratic capitalist societies permit voluntary formation of private corporations and allot them a sphere of economic liberty within which to function, which gives those who value such enterprises a powerful incentive to resist both statism and socialism. Because tyranny is far more likely to come from the public sector than the private, those who for selfish reasons strive to maintain both a democratic capitalist society and, of particular relevance to the present argument, a substantial sphere of economic liberty therein serve the public interest.
Id. (citing MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY, supra note 158, at 45); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 25 (same).
200. See Bainbridge, supra note 158, at 597 (asserting that Novak's claim that corporations act as communities developing citizens with shared values "deserves to be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism").
201. See Bainbridge, supra note 158, at 597 (suggesting that "communal values are inculcated" in "entities like churches, schools, and fraternal organizations").
202 
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Charity, Truth, and Corporate Governance 851 not. 205 He acknowledges that, at first glance, the wealth maximization norm seems inconsistent with the biblical admonition that one "cannot serve both God and money." 206 He claims, however, that the more appropriate lesson for the corporate governance debate derives from the phrase that "'No servant can serve two masters. '" 207 Bainbridge turns to the Parable of the Talents to support his position. That parable teaches that a servant is to be a faithful and obedient steward of his master. 208 Bainbridge argues that directors, as those faithful stewards, must be loyal and obedient to the shareholders, the "masters" of the directors. 209 Citing Pope John Paul II's Centesimus Annus, Bainbridge contends that Catholic Social Thought's concept of faithful stewardship requires directors of a corporation to "vigorously" pursue profits for the shareholders.
210
Bainbridge uses two models of the corporation to argue that requiring or allowing directors to consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders is inconsistent with Catholic Social Thought. His first argument is based on the traditional notion that a corporation is private property.
211 If a corporation is private property, directors are stewards who have been entrusted with resources that they do not own. 212 If directors use those resources other than for the shareholders' benefit-if they redirect resources for the benefit of other stakeholders to the detriment of shareholders-it is tantamount to stealing from their masters. 213 Directors, therefore, cannot legitimately prefer the interests of other stakeholders to those of the shareholders. Bainbridge's second argument is premised on the principle that, from an economic perspective, a corporation is a nexus of contracts, not a community. 215 In particular, a large corporation more resembles the "nanny state" than a "community of shared values."
216 Because a corporation is not a community, communitarian notions cannot justify a stakeholder approach to corporate governance.
Abuses within the corporation, Bainbridge asserts, derive not from the profit maximization norm, but from the disdain by corporate directors and managers of faith. 217 In this respect, governmental intervention is part of the problem, not the answer. 218 Governmental intervention, according to Bainbridge, has tended to impose on corporations a principles-based system of ethics that poses threats to the "private ordering of economic relationships [and] personal virtue" and is inconsistent with the Catholic tradition. 219 Instead, Bainbridge considers virtue ethics-"context-based judgment" and "the habitual private exercise of truthfulness, courage, justice, mercy, and other virtues"-as consistent with Catholic Social Thought. 221. See Sargent, supra note 11, at 562 (stating that Catholic Social Thought "embod[ies] a coherent world view centered on the core principles of human dignity, the common good, the reciprocity of rights and obligations, the contingency of property rights, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the preferential option for the poor").
220
B. CARITAS IN VERITATE AND THE LIBERTY-BASED INTERPRETATION
2010]
Charity In evaluating the models proposed by scholars who have applied Catholic Social Thought in the corporate governance debate, then, it is important to recognize that Catholic Social Thought, in general, and Caritas in Veritate, in particular, leave lots of room to move. 224 Catholic Social Thought requires, at a minimum, that corporate law allow managers to act in a moral manner. A legal norm, therefore, that would require a manager to take an action that is immoral is inconsistent with Catholic Social Thought. For this reason, a pure profit maximization norm cannot meet the requirements of Catholic Social Thought. Caritas in Veritate supports this conclusion. Like his predecessors, 225 Pope Benedict XVI indicates many times that profit cannot be the exclusive goal. 226 He also states that "the canons of justice must be respected from the outset, as the economic process unfolds, and not just afterwards or incidentally" 227 and that "[t]he Church's social doctrine has always maintained that justice must be applied to every phase of economic activity." 228 In light of these statements, it is hard to see how one could justify a pure profit maximization norm. If profit maximization cannot be the exclusive goal and justice must be applied as the "economic process unfolds" and to "every phase of economy activity," profit maximization cannot be the sole guiding principle for making a decision. 229 222. See Sargent, supra note 11, at 562-63 (noting that papal documents and bishops' statements do not make specific policy recommendations, but leave that task to the laity).
223. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 9; see CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 16, ¶ 43 ("The church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise . . . through the efforts of all those who responsibly confront concrete problems . . . ."); see also OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 16, ¶ 4 ("It is up to the Christian communities . . . to draw principles of reflection, norms of judgment and directives for action from the social teaching of the Church.").
224. See supra Part III.B.2 (noting that Caritas in Veritate leaves a lot of room for managers to work in making decisions).
225. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing how prior popes viewed the role of profit). 226. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 21 ("Once profit becomes the exclusive goal, if it is produced by improper means and without the common good as its ultimate end, it risks destroying wealth and creating poverty."); id. ¶ 38 ("Charity in truth . . . requires that shape and structure be given to those types of economic initiative which . . . aim at a higher goal than . . . profit as an end in itself."); id. ¶ 46 (favoring a "broad new composite reality . . . which does not exclude profit, but instead considers it a means for achieving human and social ends"); id. ¶ 71 (indicating that it is inappropriate to view profit maximization as "the sole criterion for action in business").
227 For Pope Benedict, as for Pope John Paul II, profit remains a legitimate criterion for corporate decision-making; it just can't be the only one. 233 The closest legal norm to pure profit maximization that Caritas in Veritate seems to allow, then, is what one might call "profit optimization with a social responsibility out."
234 Under this norm, management would be required to focus on maximizing shareholder wealth in the long-term, but in doing so, would be free to make decisions that respect the dignity of each human person involved and seek the common good, even when doing so would not maximize shareholder wealth. 
Charity, Truth, and Corporate Governance 855 optimization with a social responsibility out" would require managers to seek long-term profits, but give them the freedom to act in a manner consistent with their, and the corporation's, moral obligations to otherseven if profits would suffer as a result.
To the extent that the liberty-based interpretation allows for a pure profit maximization legal norm, it is inconsistent with Caritas in Veritate. If instead the interpretation justifies something more akin to "profit optimization with a social responsibility out," it may find support in Caritas in Veritate. Pope Benedict undoubtedly agrees with the initial premise of the liberty-based interpretation that democracy is necessary for the protection of human rights and freedom, 236 and that freedom is critical to human development. 237 He seems to be at odds, though, with the measures the liberty-based interpretation might justify for preserving democracy to allow for such development.
Novak claims that strict independence of the political, economic, and moral-cultural systems is necessary to preserve human rights and freedom. Pope Benedict, on the other hand, contends that such independence is corrosive. 238 In Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict indicates that, if the pursuit of wealth in the economic sector is separated from governmental action capable of seeking a just distribution of that wealth, "grave imbalances are produced."
239 Pope Benedict, therefore, almost certainly would allow more governmental intervention than would Novak.
240
Caritas in Veritate seems to undercut a fundamental premise of Novak's liberty-based approach. Novak argues that it is important to have a strong economic system to hold the political system in check and thereby allow the moral-cultural system to influence the economic system. He does not seem concerned, however, with ensuring a strong political system capable of holding the economic system in check for similar reasons. Yet, it is critical to Novak's liberty-based interpretation that none of the three spheres-political, economic and moral-cultural-be subordinate to either 236. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 21, 41 (noting that democracy is "capable of ensuring freedom and peace" and indicating that care needs to be taken to avoid undermining democracy).
237. See id. ¶ 17 ("Integral human development presupposes responsible freedom of the individual and of peoples . . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
238. See id. ¶ 39 (noting that "[t]he exclusive binary model of market-plus-State is corrosive of society").
239. CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 36. 240. Although likely to be more open to governmental intervention than Novak, John Breen observes that Pope Benedict XVI "has long expressed a healthy skepticism of the capacity of juridical structures and institutions to bring about substantial change in social life." Breen, supra note 133, at 1021. Loyola Law Review [Vol. 56 of the others. Caritas in Veritate observes that globalization has made the political system subordinate to the economic system. Pope Benedict points out that, as the world has become more and more interconnected, government has become impotent with respect to many economic activities. 241 Because of territorial limitations, governments do not have the necessary authority to place appropriate limits on unjust economic activities.
Novak and Pope Benedict find common ground in stressing the importance of managing a corporation with its long-term health in mind. As discussed above, Novak advocates profit optimization-maximizing profits over the long-term. He asserts that pure profit maximization, seeking to maximize profits in the short term, is destructive. Pope Benedict likewise observes the danger in using resources to achieve short-term profits at the expense of the long-term interests of a business. On the other hand, Caritas in Veritate cannot be read to support profit optimization as the sole basis for corporate decision-making. Admittedly, the pope seems to suggest that such an exclusive focus on profit optimization in corporate decision-making may have been justified in the past, when economic activity was confined within national boundaries.
242 Now, with the advent of globalization and the concomitant decrease in governmental influence, justice must be evaluated at all levels of economic activity. 243 Therefore, even if Novak previously might have found support in Catholic Social Thought for profit optimization as the sole basis for corporate decisionmaking, globalization has caused that support to dissipate.
Novak's concept of profit optimization takes into account many factors other than profit, but only to the extent that they further long-term profitability, and he seems to reject the idea that managers should consider social responsibility and the effect of decisions on stakeholders other than shareholders, except to the extent those factors affect long-term profitability. He clearly opposes legally requiring consideration of social responsibility and stakeholders, viewing it as inconsistent with the nexus of contracts model of the corporation.
Although Pope Benedict's explanation of Catholic social doctrine in Caritas in Veritate does not necessarily reject the view that a corporation is a nexus of contracts, it imposes greater responsibilities on parties to contracts than Novak would seem to require. Pope Benedict indicates that 241. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 24 (noting that globalization has resulted in limitations on sovereignty); see also id. ¶ 39 (suggesting that globalization has threatened the ability of government to ensure distributive justice).
242. 
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244
Moreover, Pope Benedict views the awareness of social responsibility within the economy to be a positive development and considers it necessary for management to consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. In making decisions, corporate management must consider, in addition to "the traditional principles of social ethics like transparency, honesty and responsibility [,] . . . the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gift."
245 Pope Benedict states very explicitly, however, that "attitudes of gratuitousness cannot be established by law."
246 Novak almost certainly would agree with this point and would suggest that, therefore, the law should not attempt to impose such obligations.
What is not clear is whether Novak would accept a legal norm that would allow, but not require, managers freely to make decisions based on the principle of gratuitousness when the decisions would be inconsistent with long-term profitability. To the extent that Novak's conception of profit optimization would make such an allowance, it would essentially mirror what this Article calls "profit optimization with a social responsibility out" and therefore likely would be consistent with Pope Benedict's explanation of Catholic Social Thought in Caritas in Veritate.
Novak and Bainbridge both argue that the profit maximization (optimization, in Novak's case) norm is, in and of itself, oriented to the common good because it is necessary for the preservation of human dignity. They view human freedom (which is necessary for human dignity) as the positive end that comes when corporate managers are required to maximize shareholder wealth. Caritas in Vertitate, on the other hand, views the preservation of human dignity as a prerequisite to maximizing shareholder wealth. Shareholder wealth cannot be maximized-and the law, therefore, cannot require shareholder wealth to be maximized-in a manner that fails to respect human dignity, nor for a purpose other than the common good. It is possible to reconcile Novak and Bainbridge's interpretation with the latter limitation, but not the former. Certainly, human freedom and human dignity are part and parcel of the common good, but Novak's and Bainbridge's profit maximization norm might require corporate managers to ignore human dignity in pursuing shareholder wealth. This approach Caritas in Veritate even seems to suggest that wealth maximization, without limits, ultimately can undermine the very good that Novak and Bainbridge claim is achieved by the profit maximization norm. Pope Benedict observes that, if wealth is sought in a manner that results in social inequality, critical elements in the economic system-"relationships of trust, dependability and respect for rules"-suffer. 248 In addition, he notes that seeking wealth in such a manner negatively affects social cohesion and places "democracy at risk."
249 Therefore, according to Caritas in Veritate, unfettered wealth maximization threatens democracy, which Novak and Bainbridge argue is a foundation for the protection of human rights and freedom.
Although Pope Benedict does not discuss private property explicitly in Caritas in Veritate, his discussion of rights and duties contradicts Bainbridge's private property argument for the shareholder wealth maximization norm. Pope Benedict very clearly indicates that rights are accompanied by duties and that duties are necessary for the preservation of rights.
250 Consistent with previous encyclicals, then, the right to private property must be subject to the obligation of owners to use it for the common good. 251 If property owners have a duty to use their property for the common good, one cannot interpret Caritas in Veritate to support a legal norm that would require agent-directors to use corporate resources to maximize profits without concern for the obligations of their shareholdermasters with respect to the common good. Pope Benedict's support for the proposition that managers have a moral obligation to consider the interests of all of a corporation's stakeholders does not depend on a communitarian view of the corporation that Bainbridge considers erroneous. Instead, the moral obligation derives from the fact that the participants in economic transactions are human beings. 252 For Pope Benedict, whether one views the corporation as a nexus of contracts or as a community is irrelevant. All decisions must take into 247 Bainbridge claims that principles-based ethics imposed by government are part of the problem and that virtue ethics-"the habitual private exercise of truthfulness, courage, justice, mercy, and other virtues"-are needed.
254
The principles-based ethics that Bainbridge decries run the risk identified in Caritas in Veritate of being slaves of the economic system rather than remedying its problems. 255 Like Bainbridge, Pope Benedict suggests that ethics must be grounded in virtue. 256 When not people-centered and grounded in the dignity of the human person and the natural law, a system of ethics itself can result in abuses.
It is hard to reconcile Bainbridge's position that shareholder wealth maximization is the appropriate legal norm for corporate governance with his notion that a focus of virtue ethics would help to curb corporate abuses. A legal norm that requires shareholder wealth maximization might require managers to act contrary to virtue. If Bainbridge's advocacy for virtue represents a modest retreat from a legal norm that requires pure wealth maximization, his liberty-based interpretation might be considered consistent with Catholic Social Thought as explained in Caritas in Veritate.
C. COMMUNITARIAN INTERPRETATION
Most scholars applying Catholic Social Thought to the corporationamong them Susan Stabile, Helen Alford, Michael Naughton, Robert Kennedy, and George Garvey 257 -take a communitarian approach 258 and contend that a legal norm requiring shareholder wealth maximization is inconsistent with Catholic Social Thought or, at best, insufficient to meet its demands. The communitarian interpretation starts with the premise that the corporation is a community of persons-consisting of employees, customers, suppliers, the local community, and perhaps others-in which the common good must be sought.
259
In seeking the common good, corporate management must respect and promote the dignity of the human person.
260
According to Stabile, "The ultimate conclusion is that the corporation-like all human institutions-should be judged by how it protects or undermines the life and dignity of the human person, by how it supports the family, and by how it 'enhances or threatens our life together as a community.'" 261 Stabile asserts that participants in the corporation have duties far beyond their contractual obligations to one another and that the common good requires decisions about corporate policy to take into account the interests of all stakeholders.
262
Kennedy likewise observes that shareholders are not the only ones who contribute to an enterprise's success. 263 Employees, for example, through their time, talent, energy and knowledge, make an investment as well.
264
Kennedy claims that a corporation owes its employees more than employment compensation. 265 A corporation must also be loyal to its employees and thus concerned about their job security.
266
According to Kennedy, managers cannot be viewed merely as agents 259 . See Alford & Naughton, supra note 160, at 38 ("The firm is a community of persons who spend many hours working together and who are part of a wider community of customers, suppliers, and local residents, not to mention their own families."); Garvey, supra note 149, at 536 (noting that Catholic Social Thought requires the firm to seek the common good and to recognize the dignity of every human person involved in the firm); Kennedy, supra note 15, at 25-26 (recognizing the corporation as a community); Stabile, supra note 8, at 184 (asserting that the corporation must be viewed as a community formed so its members can do together what they could not accomplish individually) (quoting MICHAEL NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING: WORK AND THE EXAMINED LIFE 24-25 (1996)); see generally Alford & Naughton, supra note 159 (arguing for a "common good model of the firm").
260. See Garvey, supra note 149, at 532 ("If the ends of an enterprise promotes the common good, and if the means employed do not violate the dignity of any person, the firm would surely survive the scrutiny of Catholic social teaching."); see also Stabile, supra note 8, at 184 (noting that Catholic Social Thought requires all institutions to be concerned with the common good).
261. of the shareholders. 267 Instead, they are stewards of a corporation's goods for the benefit of the shareholders, but not to the exclusion of the interests of others in the community.
268
Managers must "be concerned that opportunities for work be fairly distributed, and that the company make prudent investments to ensure that it remains competitive and viable." 269 In addition, managers must make sure that the company acts consistently with the good of society, even when acting otherwise would not be prohibited by law.
270 "In sum," Kennedy contends, "[Catholic Social Thought] respects the fact that . . . managers have a duty to attend to the rightful interests of shareholders, but it does not maintain that they have a duty to put shareholder interests ahead of the interests of other members of the community of work." 271 Garvey adds that the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity impose responsibilities on all participants in a corporation Rerum Novarum-not just management-and require each person to consider how the decisions he or she makes will affect other members of the corporate "community" and the common good in general.
272 Subsidiarity requires that decisionmaking authority be given to the lowest appropriate level within the corporation, thereby making those who understand the possible outcomes of decisions responsible for making the decisions. 273 Solidarity requires that every decision be made to further the common good, always bearing in mind the personhood, dignity, and interconnectedness of those affected by decisions.
274
At first blush, Garvey appears to claim that the communitarian interpretation of Catholic Social Thought does not necessarily conflict with the profit maximization norm. He asserts that, if a firm is functioning well, a manager will not run afoul of Catholic Social Thought by seeking to maximize profits. 275 Garvey goes on to say, however, that "[s]uch a theoretical firm would be compensating employees appropriately, using the earth's resources wisely and providing customers with quality products at fair prices." 276 In Garvey's view, then, "functioning well" means taking Alford and Naughton claim that finance has overstepped its bounds in setting up a shareholder wealth maximization norm for the corporation. 278 "While maintaining adequate return on capital employed is a crucial management issue for any firm, describing the whole purpose of the business as that of providing maximal return on capital radically impoverishes the idea of what a business is when compared to the reality of business life." 279 Alford and Naughton use the distinction between "foundational" goods and "excellent" goods to make their point. Foundational goods are those that are needed and wanted to obtain other things.
280
Excellent goods are those that are needed and desired for themselves and have no other value. 281 Profits, they assert, are foundational goods. 282 They are necessary to a business, but cannot be an end in and of themselves. 283 For a business, the excellent goods are "virtues such as justice, prudence, courage, solidarity, and patience." 284 Under Alford and Naughton's common good model, all foundational goods must be used in order to further excellent goods. 285 The shareholder wealth maximization norm, they claim, makes this impossible. 286 If every action is ordered toward profit, managers will treat employees justly only to the extent that it will maximize profit. 287 The excellent good of justice 2010] Charity, Truth, and Corporate Governance 863 therefore becomes subservient to the foundational good of profit.
288
Alford and Naughton's common good model dovetails with Pope John Paul II's assertion in Centesimus Annus that profit acts as a regulator of an organization.
289
Profit certainly is important-in fact, it is critical to a business's survival-but only as a means to loftier ends. 290 Alford and Naughton acknowledge that profit has a role, but contend that the "real world of business" involves much more than the financial. 291 Stabile maintains that the communitarian view of the corporation is consistent not only with the principles of the common good and the dignity of the human person, but also with the principles that Pope Leo XIII asserted in Rerum Novarum regarding private property. 292 She acknowledges that Pope Leo staunchly affirmed the goodness of private property, but notes that he did not espouse a right to private property without limits. 293 Instead, Pope Leo recognized that those with abundance have an obligation to use their abundance for the common good. 294 Kennedy similarly suggests that Catholic social doctrine does not allow shareholders to dispose of assets in any manner they wish. 295 The right of ownership carries with it obligations.
296
Shareholders-and therefore directors seeking shareholder interests-have an obligation to use corporate assets for the common good of the corporation and society at large.
297
Although Stabile, Alford, Naughton, Kennedy, and Garvey assert that Catholic Social Thought supports a communitarian view of the corporation, they do not necessarily advocate translating the moral requirements of Catholic Social Thought into legal requirements. 298 There are, however, contrary to Catholic principles when profit is viewed as the sole purpose of business and asserting that treating a person as a thing is always contrary to Catholic principles). 288. Alford & Naughton, supra note 160, at 41. 289. Alford & Naughton, supra note 160, at 43 (quoting CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 16, ¶ 35).
290. Id. at 37-38, 43; see Stabile, supra note 8, at 192 (asserting that Catholic Social Thought requires that profit be viewed as a means for serving the common good and not as an end in itself).
291. See Alford & Naughton, supra note 160, at 34 ("Financial considerations involve no more than one function of the firm, and the whole work of the firm can hardly be reduced to one of its functions.").
292. 300 She suggests that a legal requirement that managers do so raises difficult questions about matters such as how a corporation is to balance its obligation to pursue the common good when that obligation "conflicts with achieving financial goals or other corporate objectives."
301 She also notes the potential difficulties in government's mandating behavior that it deems "socially responsible" or consistent with the common good.
302
As an example of the difficulties involved, Stabile observes:
[O]ver the last twenty years, a number of state legislatures have passed laws of various types requiring employers, including many religious employers, who provide their employees with prescription coverage to also provide coverage of prescription contraceptives. While many would argue that it is in the common good for all employers, including religious employers, to provide such coverage, from a Catholic standpoint the mandate does grave violence to religious freedom and self-determination.
303
After reflecting on the difficulties posed by direct legal mandates, Stabile suggests that focusing on ethics and requiring disclosure of non-financial corporate performance are more viable reforms. 304 See Alford & Naughton, supra note 160, at 28 (indicating that their primary purpose is to "examine the 'shareholder model' . . . and . . . how the useful insights of finance can be incorporated into a realistic concept of business based on the idea of the common good" (emphasis added) 305 gives his imprimatur to the core principles underlying the communitarian interpretation.
Unlike some of his predecessors, Pope Benedict does not define a business enterprise as a community. For Pope Benedict, it seems, the principles underlying the communitarian interpretation stand on their own. Caritas in Veritate suggests that the principles apply merely because the corporation is an economic enterprise that involves encounters between human persons.
Caritas in Veritate clearly is consistent with the communitarian interpretation's conclusion that the profit motive must be subordinated to the common good. Likewise, both Pope Benedict and those subscribing to the communitarian interpretation consider it fundamental that profit be used only as a means and not as an end unto itself.
Pope Benedict further insists that the human person is the primary economic asset. Not surprisingly, the communitarian interpretation also emphasizes this point. Susan Stabile, for example, recognizes that all institutions must be ordered to promote the dignity of the human person, and that profit must always be subordinate to human development. For Stabile, Catholic Social Thought requires corporate decisions to be measured based on their effect on the human person. In their common good model, Helen Alford and Michael Naughton similarly focus on the need for corporations to foster conditions that promote integral human development, which is the very subject of Caritas in Veritate.
306
Pope Benedict certainly would agree with Stabile and George Garvey that participants in the corporation have a duty beyond their contractual obligations. As discussed above, Caritas in Veritate plainly states that economic activity is not only subject to the requirements of commutative justice, but also to the requirements of distributive justice. Moreover, the principles of solidarity and gratuitousness require that all participants in the corporation have "a sense of responsibility" to everyone. 307 Pope Benedict's view of the necessity of gratuitousness dovetails with Robert Kennedy's suggestion that corporations owe employees something more than compensation. A spirit of gratuitousness fosters the kind of concern 305 . The fact that Pope Benedict does not take a communitarian approach does not necessarily detract from the communitarian interpretation. Its significance lies more in disarming the argument that communitarian principles should not apply to corporate governance because it is erroneous to view the corporation as a community.
306. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 8 (indicating that the encyclical revisits Pope Paul VI's teachings on integral human development).
307. Id. ¶ 38. Loyola Law Review [Vol. 56
for loyalty and job security that Kennedy asserts employees are due.
Although Pope Benedict does not describe the corporation as a community, he indicates that Catholic social doctrine requires managers to consider not only shareholders, but also a corporation's other stakeholders, in making decisions. Pope Benedict objects to the singular consideration of the interests of shareholders, but does not appear to go so far as to require stakeholders to be treated equally with shareholders, which Robert Kennedy suggests is required. To the contrary, Pope Benedict seems to allow shareholders to be preferred over other stakeholders so long as the principles of solidarity, gratuitousness, and dignity of the human person are observed.
Pope Benedict's endorsement of the principles underlying the communitarian interpretation of Catholic Social Thought does not equate to an endorsement of a legal norm that would require consideration of nonshareholder interests, nor does it equate to approval of legally mandated "social responsibility" that purports to protect nonshareholder interests. Rather, Pope Benedict focuses very much on the need for the spirit of gift in economic matters and observes that such gratuitousness cannot be mandated by law. Moreover, he is acutely aware of the danger presented by mistaken notions of social responsibility or charity.
308 As Stabile observes, these mistaken notions can find their way into positive law. 309 To be sure, Pope Benedict, like his predecessors, is not uncomfortable with governmental intervention in appropriate circumstances. Based on Caritas in Veritate (and the other modern social encyclicals), however, such interventions in corporate governance need to be consistent with the requirements of subsidiarity 310 and must not impose a form of "social responsibility" that fails to preserve the dignity of the human person or that is detached from the natural law.
V. CONCLUSION
Consistent with prior papal encyclicals, Caritas in Veritate claims to offer no "technical solutions"
311 for the problems facing the world. This is 308. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ 45 (suggesting that, if social responsibility is not grounded in concern for the dignity of the human person and natural law, an action that purports to be socially responsible may not actually be so).
309. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (noting that legislation mandating prescription coverage for contraceptives is inconsistent with the requirements of Catholic morality).
310. See CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 1, ¶ ¶ 36, 57 (noting that government has a share in the responsibility for preserving the common good and "the governance of globalization must be marked by subsidiarity" (emphasis omitted)).
311. Id. ¶ 9; see also POPULORUM PROGESSIO, supra note 35, ¶ 81 ("[I]t belongs to the laymen . . . to infuse a Christian spirit into the mentality, customs, laws, and structures of the true to a large extent, but Pope Benedict certainly gives more direct guidance than his predecessors as to how to apply Catholic Social Thought in the context of corporate governance. The guiding principles for corporate governance explained in Caritas in Veritate might be summarized as follows:
• Profit need not be rejected, but must be oriented to the common good and sought with a long-term perspective; and
• Management must direct the corporation so that it is socially responsible, meaning that decisions must:
o Be consistent with the truth that the primary economic asset of business is the human being;
o Take into account stakeholder interests; and o Incorporate the concepts of solidarity and gratuitousness.
Caritas in Veritate does not offer a roadmap for how to structure corporate law using these principles. In fact, the principles leave much room to work in crafting practical solutions. They don't mandate a communitarian solution or foreclose a liberty-based solution. Caritas in Veritate provides important lessons for those on both sides of the corporate governance debate-both within and outside the Catholic tradition. For those supporting shareholder wealth maximization, Caritas in Veritate warns against a legal norm that would require pure wealth maximization. Management legitimately may be required to focus on maximizing shareholder wealth, but must have the freedom to take actions inconsistent with that focus when necessary to respect the dignity of each human person involved and to seek the common good.
Furthermore, a wealth maximization norm must leave management free to make decisions based community in which they live."); OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS, supra note 16, ¶ 4 ("[I]t is difficult for [the Church leaders] . . . to put forward a solution which has universal validity. . . . It is up to the Christian communities . . . to draw principles of reflection, norms of judgment and directives for action from the social teaching of the Church."); SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 16, ¶ 41 ("The Church does not have technical solutions to offer for the problem of underdevelopment" and "does not propose economic and political systems or programs."). As Pope John Paul II commented in Centesimus Annus,
The church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the efforts of all those who responsibly confront concrete problems in all their social, economic, political and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another. For such a task the church offers her social teaching as an indispensible and ideal orientation, a teaching which . . . recognizes the positive value of the market and of enterprise, but which at the same time points out that these need to be oriented towards the common good.
CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 16, ¶ 43. Loyola Law Review [Vol. 56 on a system of ethics grounded in truth, one that takes into account the interconnectedness and humanity of all stakeholders involved and their long-term best interests.
For those supporting corporate social responsibility, the encyclical teaches that determining what is socially responsible must be grounded in truth founded in the dignity of the human person and the natural law. Caritas in Veritate indicates that, without such truth, the efforts of proponents of corporate social responsibility will be fruitless or, worse, will serve private interests and become subject to manipulation in a manner designed to perpetuate the negative externalities of unfettered short-term wealth maximization.
312
If those supporting corporate social responsibility-both believers and nonbelievers alike-seek truth with sincere hearts, there is hope for true reform, for it is in the ordering of human institutions "towards [humans] as to their centre and summit" that believers and nonbelievers can find common ground in working for justice. 313 Consistent with the response of Church councils to fundamental doctrinal questions, 314 when asked the serious but less weighty question of whether a corporation should be managed to maximize shareholder wealth or in a socially responsible manner, Pope Benedict's Caritas in Veritate answers "yes." The encyclical supports profit maximization firmly stabilized in charity and corporate social responsibility anchored in truth. Corporate law scholars should now consider whether those lessons call for changes in law or changes in hearts. Once again, "yes" probably is the best answer.
